The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence
The theory of large-scale entry into an industry is made complicated by its game-theoretic aspects. Even in the simplest case of one established firm facing one prospective entrant, there are some subtle strategic interactions. The established firm's pre-entry decisions can influence the prospective entrant's view of what will happen if he enters, and the established firm will try to exploit this possibility to its own advantage.
Year of publication: |
1979
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Authors: | Dixit, Avinash |
Institutions: | Department of Economics, University of Warwick |
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