The role of matching grants as a commitment device in the federation model with a repeated soft budget setting
Year of publication: |
2019
|
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Authors: | Akai, Nobuo ; Sato, Motohiro |
Published in: |
Economics of governance. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1435-6104, ZDB-ID 1491330-6. - Vol. 20.2019, 1, p. 23-39
|
Subject: | Commitment device | Matching grant | Repeated game | Soft budget | Theorie | Theory | Finanzausgleich | Intergovernmental transfers | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Budgetrestriktion | Budget constraint |
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