The Role of Tying Contracts for the Optimal Marketing of Durable Products

Tying contracts are well-known for their anti-competitive potential. This paper questions their negative image by showing that tying contracts can be necessary to implement price signals which overcome problems of asymmetric information in the introductory phase of a new durable product. The argument is applied to two antitrust cases against tying arrangements, the German Meto case and the US American SCM case.

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Year of publication:	1995-08
Authors:	Kamecke, Ulrich
Institutions:	University of Bonn, Germany
Subject:	Tying contracts \| price signals \| antitrust policy

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Series:	Discussion Paper Serie A.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series Sonderforschungsbereich 303, University of Bonn, Germany 17 pages
Classification:	L15 - Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility ; L42 - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005001439