The sensitivity of weight selection on the Condorcet efficiency of weighted scoring rules
A weighted scoring rule, Rule , on three alternative elections selects the winner by awarding 1 point to each voter's first ranked candidate, points to the second ranked candidate, and zero to the third ranked candidate. The Condorcet winner is the candidate that would defeat each other candidate in a series of pairwise elections by majority rule. The Condorcet efficiency of Rule is the conditional probability that Rule selects the Condorcet winner, given that a Condorcet winner exists. Borda rule (=1/2) is the weighted scoring rule that maximizes Condorcet efficiency. The current study considers the conditional probability that Borda rule selects the Rule winner, given that Rule elects the Condorcet winner with a large electorate.
Year of publication: |
1998-06-02
|
---|---|
Authors: | Gehrlein, William V. |
Published in: |
Social Choice and Welfare. - Springer. - Vol. 15.1998, 3, p. 351-358
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Voting paradoxes and group coherence : the condorcet efficiency of voting rules
Gehrlein, William V., (2011)
-
Gehrlein, William V., (2005)
-
Nontraditional approaches to the statistical classification and regression problems
Gehrlein, William V., (1997)
- More ...