The Shapley Valuation Function for Strategic Games in which Players Cooperate
In this note we use the Shapley value to define a valuation function. A valuation function associates with every non-empty coalition of players in a strategic game a vector of payoffs for the members of the coalition that provides these players’ valuations of cooperating in the coalition. The Shapley valuation function is defined using the lower-value based method to associate coalitional games with strategic games that was introduced in Carpente et al. (2005). We discuss axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley valuation function. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2006
Year of publication: |
2006
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Authors: | Carpente, Luisa ; Casas-Méndez, Balbina ; García-Jurado, Ignacio ; Nouweland, Anne |
Published in: |
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research. - Springer. - Vol. 63.2006, 3, p. 435-442
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Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
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