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The Social Discount Rate

In welfare theory it is standard to pick the consumption stream that maximizes the welfare of the representative agent. We argue against this position, and show that a benevolent social planner will generally place a greater weight on future consumption than does the representative agent. Our analysis has immediate implications for public policy: agents discount the future too much and the government should promote future oriented policies.
Year of publication:
2000-10
Authors: Caplin, Andrew ; Leahy, John
Institutions: National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
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Extent:
application/pdf
Series:
Type of publication: Book / Working Paper
Notes:
PE published as Andrew Caplin & John Leahy, 2004. "The Social Discount Rate," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(6), pages 1257-1268, December. Number 7983
Classification: D60 - Welfare Economics. General ; D90 - Intertemporal Choice and Growth. General
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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005085339
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