The social value of public information with costly information acquisition
In a beauty contest framework, public authorities decide the accuracy of public information evaluating how it affects individual actions and private information acquisition. More precise public information increases welfare whenever its marginal cost does not exceed that of private information.
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Colombo, Luca ; Femminis, Gianluca |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 100.2008, 2, p. 196-199
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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