The Speed of Rational Learning
A stage game is played infinitely many times. After observing the outcomes of the games, players revise their beliefs about opponents' strategies. I show the general conditions under which players' predictions become accurate fast. Key words: Repeated Games, Rational Learning, Speed of Convergence Journal of Economic Literature classification number: D83 Learning.
Year of publication: |
1997-07
|
---|---|
Authors: | Sandroni, Alvaro |
Institutions: | Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science (CMS-EMS), Kellogg Graduate School of Management |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Sandroni, Alvaro, (1997)
-
Eliciting Beliefs by Paying in Chance
Sandroni, Alvaro, (2013)
-
Reciprosity and Cooperation in Repeated Coordination Games: The Blurry Belief Approach
Sandroni, Alvaro, (1997)
- More ...