The stability of decision making in committees : the one-core
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kenfack, Joseph Armel Momo ; Pongou, Roland ; Tchantcho, Bertrand |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 122.2014, 3, p. 390-395
|
Subject: | Voting | Group decisions | Committee games | Core | One-core | Gruppenentscheidung | Group decision-making | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Entscheidung | Decision |
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