The substitutes condition and the lattice structure of the set of stable allocations
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Flanagan, Francis X. |
Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 53.2014, p. 106-110
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Subject: | Matching with contracts | Many-to-one matching | Stability | Lattice | Theorie | Theory | Matching | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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