I argue that the Supreme Court should be studied as a democratic representative institution. While normative political theorists do not tend to view the Court as representative, their theorizing has produced a concept of representation that can be used a starting point for studying the Court. The Court is not the same sort of representative as a legislative representative, however: I argue the Court is unique in terms of its obligations, the judgment it exercises, and citizens' indirect exercise of sovereignty. The uniqueness of the Court's representative character indicates it is institutionally situated to act as a check on some of the excesses of democracy. Yet, unlike many other checks, I argue the Court is internal to the democratic system, that is, it is has the potential to be a democratic check. I conclude with the suggestion that some of the unique features of the Court highlight overlooked aspects of democratic representation. For one, studies of democratic representation should consider not only the particular institution in question, but also the context of the institution - its links to other institutions, and its relations to other political actors. For another, studying the Court as representative brings attention to the democratic virtues and vices of indirectness: indirectness might improve the character of deliberation, and act as an internal check on the potential excesses of popular sovereignty, but it also has the potential to decrease accountability
