The tenuous relationship between effort and performance pay
Year of publication: |
2015
|
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Authors: | Kvaløy, Ola ; Olsen, Trond E. |
Published in: |
Journal of public economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0047-2727, ZDB-ID 183995-0. - Vol. 121.2015, p. 32-39
|
Subject: | Incentives | Performance pay | Contract enforcement | Leistungsentgelt | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Arbeitsintensität | Labour intensity | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard |
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