The Timing of Multilateral Lending.
Bargaining over the terms of multilateral lending can be a prolonged process. We model failure to come to quick agreement as a screening device. Policy makers who find conditionality especially costly delay to signal their type. We show that increased costs to not reaching agreement, whether borne by borrowers or lenders, can increase the chances of delay.
Year of publication: |
2000
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Authors: | Perraudin, William ; Sibert, Anne |
Published in: |
Economic Journal. - Royal Economic Society - RES, ISSN 1468-0297. - Vol. 110.2000, 460, p. 192-211
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Publisher: |
Royal Economic Society - RES |
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