The uniqueness of dynamic groves mechanisms on restricted domains
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Yoon, Kiho |
Published in: |
The Korean economic review. - Seoul : KEA, ZDB-ID 2757469-6. - Vol. 37.2021, 2, p. 263-285
|
Subject: | Groves Mechanism | Dynamic Mechanism Design | Ex-post Incentive | Compatibility | Outcome Efficiency | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Anreiz | Incentives |
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