The use of non-verifiable information regarding the agent's action in compensation contracts
Year of publication: |
April 2016
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Authors: | Adithipyangkul, Pattarin |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics letters. - Irvine, Calif. : Scientific Research, ISSN 2162-2078, ZDB-ID 2657454-8. - Vol. 6.2016, 2, p. 234-245
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Subject: | Subjective Performance Evaluation | Implicit Contract | Non-Verifiable Information | Theorie | Theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Implizite Kontrakte | Implicit contracts | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
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