The Use of Targeting in Port State Control

This study will examine two separate, but related matters; (1) expansion of port State control through new treaties and international practice, and (2) the port State's use of targeting to focus its attention on substandard performance. It will also outline and clarify the practice of targeting which has been employed under several regional port State control agreements throughout the world. This study will examine targeting as an economic sanction; in essence, a coercive measure using financial disincentives to discourage substandard performance in the maritime community. Targeting was designed or developed as an economic sanction. Rather, it was marketed as a "rise management" tool employed by the port State to preclude substandard actors from operating int he port States' territory. The need for integrity, adherence to international laws and treaties, and proper behavior, (doing what is right) all seem obvious, but the reality is that unless the system incorporates appropriate incentives for compliance (or disincentives for noncompliance), the regime will be unsuccessful