The Value for Actions-Set Games

Action-Set games are transferable utility games where the set of players is finite, every player has a finite set of actions, and the worth of the game is a function of the actions taken by the players. In this setting a rule has to determine individual payoffs at each combinations of actions. Following an axiomatic approach, we define the set of Consistent Bargaining Equilibria.

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Year of publication:	2009-02
Authors:	Calvo, Emilio ; Urbano, Amparo
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	Action-set games \| Shapley value \| Prekernel \| Consistent Bargaining Equilibria

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	MPRA Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005623235