The Value of Precontract Information About an Agent's Ability in the Presence of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | BANKER, RAJIV D. ; DARROUGH, MASAKO ; LI, SHAOPENG ; THREINEN, LUCAS |
Published in: |
Journal of Accounting Research. - Wiley, ISSN 1475-679X, ZDB-ID 2060654-0. - Vol. 57.2019, 5 (06.12.), p. 1201-1245
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Publisher: |
Wiley |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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