The Welfare Economics of Moral Hazard

Richard Arnott, Joseph Stiglitz

This paper shows that, except in certain limiting cases, competitive equilibrium with moral hazard is constrained inefficient. The first section compares the competitive equilibrium and the constrained social optimum in a fairly general model, and identifies types of market failure. Each of the subsequent sections focuses on a particular market failure

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Year of publication:	April 1990
Authors:	Arnott, Richard
Other Persons:	Stiglitz, Joseph (contributor)
Institutions:	National Bureau of Economic Research (contributor)
Publisher:	Cambridge, Mass : National Bureau of Economic Research
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Moral Hazard \| Moral hazard \| Wohlfahrtsanalyse \| Welfare analysis \| Wohlfahrtsökonomik \| Welfare economics \| Krankenversicherung \| Health insurance

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Series:	NBER working paper series ; no. w3316
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Mode of access: World Wide Web System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers.
Other identifiers:	10.3386/w3316 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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