The winner's curse: why is the cost of sports mega-events so often underestimated?

Auction theory, when the bidders do not know the value of what is auctionned, is used to explain how the Olympic Games are allocated to competing bidding cities. It is a centralized allocation process with asymmetric information which usually comes out with a winner's curse. Various indicators of the latter are proposed and exemplified, the major one being the systematic ex ante underestimation of the Olympics costs.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Andreff, Wladimir
Institutions:	HAL
Subject:	auctions \| bids \| winner's curse \| asymmetric information \| cost underestimation \| mega sporting events \| Olympics

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Post-Print.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00703466 Published, International Handbook on the Economics of Mega Sporting Events, Edward Elgar (Ed.), 2012, 37-69
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010635000