Theoretical foundations of relational incentive contracts
Year of publication: |
2021
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Authors: | Watson, Joel |
Published in: |
Annual review of economics. - Palo Alto, Calif. : Annual Reviews, ISSN 1941-1391, ZDB-ID 2516757-1. - Vol. 13.2021, p. 631-659
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Subject: | relational contracts | enforcement | game theory | negotiation | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Rechtsdurchsetzung | Law enforcement | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Vertrag | Contract |
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