Third- and higher-price auctions

Elmar Wolfstetter

This paper solves the equilibrium bid functions of third- and higher-price auctions for a large class of distribution functions of bidders’ valuations, assuming the symmetric independent private values framework, and risk neutrality. In all these auctions, equilibrium bids exceed bidders’ valuations, and bidders raise their bids when one moves to a higher price auction, and lower bids when the number of bidders is increased. -- auctions ; procurement

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Year of publication:	1995
Authors:	Wolfstetter, Elmar
Institutions:	Sonderforschungsbereich Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse (contributor)
Publisher:	Berlin : Humboldt-Universität
Subject:	Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 7 S., 158,05 KB)
Series:	Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373. - Berlin : Humboldt-Universität, ISSN 1436-1086, ZDB-ID 2135319-0. - Vol. 1996,3
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/66241 [Handle]
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; H57 - Procurement ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009630548