Third Down with a Yard to Go: The Dixit-Skeath Conundrum on Equilibria in Competitive Games.

In strictly competitive games, equilibrium mixed strategies are invariant to changes in the ultimate prizes. Dixit & Skeath (1999) argue that this seems counter-intuitive. We show that this invariance is robust to dropping the independence axiom, but is removed if we drop the reduction axiom.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1999-07
Authors:	Grant, S. ; Kajii, A. ; Polak, B.
Institutions:	College of Business and Economics, Australian National University
Subject:	GAME THEORY \| COMPETITION \| EXPECTATIONS

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	10 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005532897