Three-agent Peer Evaluation

I show that every rule for dividing a dollar among three agents impartially (so that each agent's share depends only on her evaluation by her associates) underpays some agent by at least one-third of a dollar for some consistent profile of evaluations. I then produce an impartial division rule that never underpays or overpays any agent by more than one-third of a dollar, and for most consistent evaluation profiles does much better.

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Year of publication:	2008-08
Authors:	Knoblauch, Vicki
Institutions:	Department of Economics, University of Connecticut
Subject:	division function \| impartial \| consensual

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The price is Free Number 2008-28 9 pages
Classification:	D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005839010