Threshold strategy-proofness : on manipulability in large voting problems
Year of publication: |
2004
|
---|---|
Authors: | Ehlers, Lars H. ; Peters, Hans J. M. ; Storcken, Ton |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 49.2004, 1, p. 103-116
|
Subject: | Nutzenfunktion | Utility function | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Theorie | Theory |
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