Through trial & error to collusion

In this note we study a very simple trial & error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity by one unit as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that despite the absence of any coordination or punishing device this process converges to a collusive outcome.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Huck, Steffen ; Oechssler, Jörg ; Normann, Hans-Theo
Publisher:	Berlin : Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Series:	SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; 1999,57
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	722292767 [GVK] hdl:10419/61755 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199957 [RePEc]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010310032