Timing and virtual observability in ultimatum bargaining and "weak link" coordination games
Year of publication: |
2004
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Authors: | Weber, Roberto A. ; Camerer, Colin ; Knez, Marc |
Published in: |
Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V., ISSN 1386-4157, ZDB-ID 1386451-8. - Vol. 7.2004, 1, p. 25-48
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Subject: | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Zeit | Time | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Theorie | Theory | Koordination | Coordination |
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