Timing of communication
Year of publication: |
14 April 2020
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Authors: | Bhattacharya, Puja ; Nielsen, Kirby ; Sengupta, Arjun |
Published in: |
The economic journal : the journal of the Royal Economic Society. - Oxford : Oxford University Press, ISSN 1468-0297, ZDB-ID 1473822-3. - Vol. 130.2020, 630, p. 1623-1649
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Subject: | Arbeitsproduktivität | Labour productivity | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Informationsverhalten | Information behaviour | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game |
Description of contents: |
Abstract. Using an experiment, we demonstrate that a communication regime in which a worker communicates about his intended effort is less effective in: (i) sol
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Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Gesehen am 26.11.2020 |
Other identifiers: | 10.1093/ej/ueaa042 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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