Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash : Controllability in Policy Games

This paper generalizes the classical theory of economic policy to a static LQ-strategic context between n players. We show how this generalized version of controllability can profitably be used to deal with policy ineffectiveness issues and Nash equilibrium existence

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Year of publication:	2005
Authors:	Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni ; Acocella, Nicola
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Wirtschaftspolitik \| Economic policy \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium \| Großbritannien \| United Kingdom \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (19 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 2005 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.849025 [DOI]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; E52 - Monetary Policy (Targets, Instruments, and Effects) ; E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014061330