To commit or not to commit? An experimental investigation of pre-commitments in bargaining situations with asymmetric information

In a recent paper Konrad and Thum (2014) present a model that shows that unilateral pre-commitment reduces the likelihood of agreement in bilateral negotiations over the provision of a public good when parties have private information over their contribution costs. We test the model in a laboratory experiment paying particular attention to how behavioral motivations other than payoff-maximization affect the strength of the model's result.

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Hoffmann, Sönke ; Mihm, Benedikt ; Weimann, Joachim
Published in:	Journal of Public Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0047-2727. - Vol. 121.2015, C, p. 95-105
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Pre-commitments \| Bargaining \| Asymmetric information \| Social preferences

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011190986