To favor more or less? : corporate lobbying over preferential treatment to state-owned enterprises
Year of publication: |
2019
|
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Authors: | Cai, Dapeng ; Li, Jie |
Published in: |
Journal of regulatory economics. - Norwell, Mass. [u.a.] : Springer, ISSN 0922-680X, ZDB-ID 1027173-9. - Vol. 55.2019, 3, p. 334-357
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Subject: | Corporate lobbying | Preferential treatment | Public enterprises | Common agency game | Privatization | Interessenpolitik | Lobbying | Öffentliches Unternehmen | Public enterprise | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory | Privatisierung |
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