To invest or screen efficiently: a potential conflict in relationships governed by incomplete contracts
Year of publication: |
2001
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Authors: | Bac, Mehmet |
Published in: |
International journal of industrial organization. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-7187, ZDB-ID 8753556. - Vol. 19.2001, 3-4, p. 567-588
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