To mitigate or not to mitigate: Regulatory treatment of emissions trading and its effect on marketplace incentives

The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (hereafter CAAA) have created a market-based mechanism that is designed to employ a profit-oriented incentive to enable electric utilities to reduce SO{sub 2} emissions at the least cost. One of the most important challenges facing state regulatory utility commissions in the next decade is the integration of this marker-based profit-incentive process into the traditional rate-base, rate-of-return, profit-control approach to regulation. How the struggle to meld two potentially contradictory control and incentive programs will be resolved remains to be seen. As of now, it is an open question. The purpose of this paper is to help clarify some of the issues that need to be addressed and to offer some policy recommendations that will allow regulators to employ the effectiveness of market forces while they still retain overall control of the evolution of the regulated electric supply market.