Tolerance-based punishment in continuous public goods game
Altruistic punishment for defectors is considered as a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. However, there is no clear border between the cooperative and defective behaviors in a continuous strategy game. We propose a model to study the effect of punishment on the evolution of cooperation in continuous public goods game, wherein individuals have the traits to punish the co-players based on social tolerance. We show that a reasonable punishment with a uniform tolerance can spur individuals to make more investments. Additionally, for a fixed punishment cost and a fixed fine, a moderate value of tolerance can result in the best promotion of cooperation. Furthermore, we investigate the coevolutionary dynamics of investment and tolerance. We find that the population splits into two branches: high-tolerance individuals who make high investments and low-tolerance individuals who make low investments. A dynamic equilibrium is achieved between these two types of individuals. Our work extends punishment to continuous cooperative behaviors and the results may enhance the understanding of altruistic punishment in the evolution of human cooperation.
Year of publication: |
2012
|
---|---|
Authors: | Gao, Jia ; Li, Zhi ; Cong, Rui ; Wang, Long |
Published in: |
Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications. - Elsevier, ISSN 0378-4371. - Vol. 391.2012, 16, p. 4111-4120
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Continuous public goods game | Punishment | Tolerance | Investment |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by subject
-
The Impact of Tolerance on Economic Modernization in a Comparative Perspective
Shcherbak, Andrey, (2013)
-
Pollution standards, technology investment and fines for non-compliance
Arguedas, Carmen, (2013)
-
Do punitive damages promote deterrence?
Boyd, James W., (1999)
- More ...
Similar items by person