Too big to prevail: The paradox of power in coalition formation
Year of publication: |
2021
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Authors: | Ke, Changxia ; Morath, Florian ; Newell, Anthony ; Page, Lionel |
Publisher: |
Innsbruck : University of Innsbruck, Research Platform Empirical and Experimental Economics (eeecon) |
Subject: | Shapley Value | (Non) Binding Agreement | Balance of Power | Communication |
Series: | |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 1761743988 [GVK] hdl:10419/240437 [Handle] RePEc:inn:wpaper:2021-09 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C71 - Cooperative Games ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances |
Source: |
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Too big to prevail : the paradox of power in coalition formation
Ke, Changxia, (2021)
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Too big to prevail : the paradox of power in coalition formation
Ke, Changxia, (2021)
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Too Big to Prevail: The Paradox of Power in Coalition Formation
Ke, Changxia, (2021)
- More ...
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Too Big to Prevail: The Paradox of Power in Coalition Formation
Ke, Changxia, (2021)
-
Too big to prevail : the paradox of power in coalition formation
Ke, Changxia, (2021)
-
Too big to prevail : the paradox of power in coalition formation
Ke, Changxia, (2021)
- More ...