Top Executive Remuneration: A View from Europe
We argue that the dominance of principal-agent theory as an approach to investigating executive pay has led to an overly narrow focus which may be unhelpful when considering cross-country differences and probably also hinders within-country analysis. The paper discusses the interlinked nature of three available theoretical lenses, namely principal-agent, executive power, and stewardship/stakeholder theories. It argues that institutional theory can provide a useful overarching framework within which appropriate variants of these approaches can be deployed to better comprehend developments in executive pay. We illustrate our approach with a discussion of executive pay in the UK and in Germany. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2005.
Year of publication: |
2005
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Authors: | Bruce, Alistair ; Buck, Trevor ; Main, Brian G. M. |
Published in: |
Journal of Management Studies. - Wiley Blackwell, ISSN 0022-2380. - Vol. 42.2005, 7, p. 1493-1506
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
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