Tournaments As a Worker Discipline Device.
This article explores the macroeconomic implications of tournaments as a worker discipline device in the vein of shirking models. It is shown that, if the full exploitation of tournaments is feasible, there will be no involuntary unemployment. Thus, as far as the elimination of involuntary unemployment is concerned, tournaments can serve as a perfect substitute for the so-called "employment fee" or "bonding" scheme. An immediate corollary of this finding is that the involuntary nature of unemployment must ultimately rely upon impediments that hinder the full exploitation of tournaments. Copyright 2001 by Oxford University Press.
Year of publication: |
2001
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Authors: | Lin, Chung-Cheng ; Yang, C C |
Published in: |
Economic Inquiry. - Western Economic Association International - WEAI. - Vol. 39.2001, 4, p. 644-50
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Publisher: |
Western Economic Association International - WEAI |
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