Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring.
This paper investigates pure strategy sequential equilibria of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. The approach emphasizes the equilibrium value set and the static optimization problems embedded in extremal equilibria. A succession of propositions, central among which is "self-generation," allow properties of constrained efficient supergame equilibria to be deduced from the solutions of the static problems. The authors show that the latter include solutions having a "bang-bang" property; this affords a significant simplification of the equilibria that need be considered. These results apply to a broad class of asymmetric games, thereby generalizing their earlier work on optimal cartel equilibria. Copyright 1990 by The Econometric Society.
Year of publication: |
1990
|
---|---|
Authors: | Abreu, Dilip ; Pearce, David ; Stacchetti, Ennio |
Published in: |
Econometrica. - Econometric Society. - Vol. 58.1990, 5, p. 1041-63
|
Publisher: |
Econometric Society |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Renegotiation and summetry in repeated games
Abreu, Dilip, (1989)
-
Renegotiation and symmetry in repeated games
Abreu, Dilip, (1989)
-
Renegotiation and symmetry in repeated games
Abreu, Dilip, (1989)
- More ...