Toward a new comparative public law of central bank legislation: Designing legislative mandates for central bank private securities assets purchases and nominal GDP targeting

What role could unconventional monetary policy - and particularly unconventional policies like private asset purchases under a quantitative easing or lender of last resort scheme - play in influencing economic growth directly? A wide literature in economics explores the pros and cons of using these policies. However, most studies also point to the uncertain and antagonistic legal basis for such purchases. In this paper, we show how the statutory mandate for nominal GDP targeting could best put in place the legal foundations for such asset purchases. We review the legislative and regulatory bases for private securities purchases made by central banks in a sample of countries. We discuss - if legislators and policymakers wanted to - how they might introduce clearer mandates to make such purchases into their public law. We finally show how legal authorizations for GDP targeting might (and probably should) provide for such authorisations. Our discussion sheds light on the fascinating and almost completely ignored area of public law, namely central bank law.