Toward general impossibility theorems in pure exchange economies
We study the possibility of strategy-proof and efficient mechanisms in pure exchange economies. In his remarkable paper, Zhou (1991) establishes an elegant impossibility result: there is no strategy-proof, efficient, and non-dictatorial mechanism in the two-agent case. He conjectures that there is no strategy-proof, efficient, and "non-inversely-dictatorial" mechanism in the case of three or more agents. However, we discover some counterexamples to his conjecture in the case of four or more agents. We present a new interesting open question: Is there any strategy-proof, efficient, and "non-alternately-dictatorial" mechanism?
Year of publication: |
2002-07-08
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Authors: | Kato, Miki ; Ohseto, Shinji |
Published in: |
Social Choice and Welfare. - Springer. - Vol. 19.2002, 3, p. 659-664
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Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
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