Towards a set of design principles for executive compensation contracts
Year of publication: |
December 2016
|
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Authors: | Shan, Yaowen ; Walter, Terry S. |
Published in: |
Abacus : a journal of accounting, finance and business studies. - Oxford [u.a.] : Blackwell, ISSN 0001-3072, ZDB-ID 410131-5. - Vol. 52.2016, 4, p. 619-684
|
Subject: | Design principles | Executive compensation | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system |
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