Tractability in Incentive Contracting
Year of publication: |
2009-11
|
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Authors: | Edmans, Alex ; Gabaix, Xavier |
Institutions: | C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers |
Subject: | closed forms | contract theory | dispersive order | executive compensation | incentives | principal-agent problem | subderivative |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 7578 |
Classification: | D2 - Production and Organizations ; D3 - Distribution ; G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance ; J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs |
Source: |
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Edmans, Alex, (2009)
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Risk and the CEO Market: Why Do Some Large Firms Hire Highly-Paid, Low-Talent CEOs?
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Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?
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Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer
Edmans, Alex, (2015)
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Risk and the CEO Market: Why Do Some Large Firms Hire Highly-Paid, Low-Talent CEOs?
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