Trademark Protection and CEO Risk-taking Incentives

Using the passage of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) as an exogenous shock to trademark protection, we find that stronger trademark protection induces firms to increase their CEO risk-taking incentives as measured by CEO portfolio vega. The effect is greater for firms facing more fierce competition, firms with better corporate governance, and firms in high-tech and service industries. Further analysis reveals that vega is effective in encouraging CEO risk-taking behavior after the passage of the FTDA. Overall, our findings suggest that shareholders provide more incentives in the compensation design to motivate CEO risk-taking activities in response to the heightened trademark protection

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Year of publication:	2022
Authors:	Chen, Tao ; Chen, Yangyang ; Yang, Bin ; Yuan, Tao
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Markenartikel \| Brand \| Führungskräfte \| Managers \| Markenrecht \| Trademark law \| Risikopräferenz \| Risk attitude \| Theorie \| Theory \| Anreiz \| Incentives \| Leistungsentgelt \| Performance pay \| Managervergütung \| Executive compensation

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (56 p)
Series:	Nanyang Business School Research Paper ; No. 22-37
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments September 1, 2020 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.4211292 [DOI]
Classification:	G30 - Corporate Finance and Governance. General ; K11 - Property Law ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs) ; O34 - Intellectual Property Rights: National and International Issues
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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