Trees and extensive forms
This paper addresses the question of what it takes to obtain a well-defined extensive form game. Without relying on simplifying finiteness or discreteness assumptions, we characterize the class of game trees for which all pure strategy combinations induce unique outcomes. The generality of the set-up covers "exotic" cases, like stochastic games or decision problems in continuous time (differential games). We find that the latter class, though a well-defined problem, fails this test.
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Alós-Ferrer, Carlos ; Ritzberger, Klaus |
Published in: |
Journal of Economic Theory. - Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531. - Vol. 143.2008, 1, p. 216-250
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Extensive forms Trees Sequential decision theory Differential games |
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