Trigger-point mechanism and conditional commitment : implications for entry, collusion, and welfare
Year of publication: |
2007
|
---|---|
Authors: | Qiu, Larry D. ; Cheng, Leonard K. ; Fung, Michael Ka-yiu |
Published in: |
Contemporary economic policy : a journal of Western Economic Association International. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1074-3529, ZDB-ID 1182800-6. - Vol. 25.2007, 2, p. 156-169
|
Subject: | Anreizregulierung | Incentive regulation | Sunk Costs | Sunk costs | Markteintritt | Market entry | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Theorie | Theory |
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