Trust Among Strangers

The paper presents a simulation of the dynamics of impersonal trust. It shows how a 'trust/reciprocation' norm can emerge and stabilize in populations of conditional cooperators. The norm, or behavioral regularity, is not to be identified with a single strategy. It is instead supported by several conditional strategies that vary in the frequency and intensity of sanctions

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Bicchieri, Cristina ; Duffy, John ; Tolle, Gil
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Verhandlungstheorie \| Bargaining theory \| Vertrauen \| Confidence \| Experiment \| Reputation

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (42 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Philosophy of Science 71: 1-34, 2004 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments January 1, 2002 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.304344 [DOI]
Classification:	Z13 - Social Norms and Social Capital ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making ; D6 - Welfare Economics ; A1 - General Economics ; C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014119208