Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes
Year of publication: |
2006-09
|
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Authors: | Sliwka, Dirk |
Institutions: | Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |
Subject: | social preferences | incentives | intrinsic motivation | motivation crowding-out | social norms | trust | conformity | selection |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 2293 31 pages |
Classification: | M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs) ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights |
Source: |
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On the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes
Sliwka, Dirk, (2003)
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On the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes
Sliwka, Dirk, (2003)
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On the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes
Sliwka, Dirk, (2003)
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Can Contracts Signal Social Norms? Experimental Evidence
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The Contribution of Managers to Organizational Success: Evidence from German Soccer
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Transparency and Reciprocal Behavior in Employment Relations
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