Trust, Values and False Consensus
Trust beliefs are heterogeneous across individuals and, at the same time, persistent across generations. We investigate one mechanism yielding these dual patterns: false consensus. In the context of a trust game experiment, we show that individuals extrapolate from their own type when forming trust beliefs about the same pool of potential partners - i.e., more (less) trustworthy individuals form more optimistic (pessimistic) trust beliefs - and that this tendency continues to color trust beliefs after several rounds of game-play. Moreover, we show that one's own type/trustworthiness can be traced back to the values parents transmit to their children during their upbringing. In a second closely-related experiment, we show the economic impact of mis-calibrated trust beliefs stemming from false consensus. Miscalibrated beliefs lower participants' experimental trust game earnings by about 20 percent on average.
Year of publication: |
2012-10
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Authors: | Giuliano, Paola ; Guiso, Luigi ; Butler, Jeffrey |
Institutions: | National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | POL The price is Paper copy available by mail Number 18460 |
Classification: | A1 - General Economics ; A12 - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines ; D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles ; Z1 - Cultural Economics |
Source: |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950649