Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts [technical version]
In trials witnesses often gain by slanting their testimony. The law tries to elicit the truth from witnesses by cross-examination under threat of criminal prosecution for perjury. As a truth-revealing mechanism, perjury law is crude and ineffective. We develop the mathematical form of a perfect truth-revealing mechanism, which exactly offsets the gain from slanted testimony by the risk of a possible sanction. Implementing an effective truth-revealing mechanism requires a witness to certify accuracy by posting bond. If events subsequently prove that the testimony was inaccurate, the witness forfeits the bond. By providing superior incentives for telling the truth, truth-bonding could combat some distortions by factual witnesses and interested experts, including “junk scienceâ€.
Year of publication: |
2001-04-30
|
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Authors: | Cooter, Robert D. ; Emons, Winand |
Institutions: | Law, Economics and Institutions, Boalt School of Law |
Saved in:
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