Truth-telling and trust in sender-receiver games with intervention

Mehmet Y. Gurdal; Ayca Ozdogan; Ismail Saglam

Recent experimental studies find excessive truth-telling in strategic information transmission games with conflictive preferences. In this paper, we show that this phenomenon is more pronounced in sender-receiver games where a truthful regulator randomly intervenes. We also establish that intervention significantly increases the excessive trust of receivers. -- Strategic information transmission ; truth-telling ; trust, sender-receiver game

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Gurdal, Mehmet Y. ; Ozdogan, Ayca ; Sağlam, İsmail
Publisher:	Istanbul : TÜSİAD- Koç University Economic Research Forum
Subject:	Informationsverbreitung \| Information dissemination \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 31 S., 571,09 KB) graph. Darst.
Series:	Koç University - TÜSİAD Economic Research Forum working paper series. - İstanbul, ZDB-ID 2440580-2. - Vol. 1123
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/108571 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C90 - Design of Experiments. General ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009306849